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ABSTRACT
This article evaluates the performance of economic growth forecasts disclosed by three 
international organisations − the IMF, the European Commission and the OECD − and 
compares it with that of the mean forecasts of two surveys of private analysts − the 
Consensus Economics and The Economist. The aim is to help forecast users in answering 
the question of how much (little) conﬁ   dence they should place in the alternative 
forecasts that are available at each moment. The evaluation covers projections for 
nine advanced economies over the period 1991-2009. Several evaluation criteria are 
used: the quantitative and the directional accuracy of forecasts and, also, the ability 
to predict economic recessions. The results suggest that the forecasting performance 
of the international organisations is broadly similar to that of the surveys of private 
analysts. By and large, current-year forecasts present desirable features and clearly 
outperform year-ahead forecasts for which evidence is more mixed.
1. Introduction
Considerable effort and resources are devoted to forecasting major economic variables and the publi-
cation of forecasts usually attracts great interest of economists, policymakers and the general public. 
Although some of the disappointment that arises from time to time with macroeconomic forecasting 
might be justiﬁ  ed, part of it reﬂ  ects a failure to inform forecast users of how much (little) conﬁ  dence 
to place in forecasts. An empirical evaluation of the past accuracy of the various forecasters and of 
their relative performance might help the user to make an informed use of the many different predic-
tions available.
This article will evaluate the forecasting record of three leading international organisations − the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC) and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) − and compare it with that of two surveys of private analysts 
− the Consensus Economics and The Economist. The forecasts published twice a year by the three 
international organisations receive a great deal of media attention and are usually perceived to beneﬁ  t 
from the large amount of intellectual/physical resources devoted to their production. However, many 
private sector analysts (including banks, corporations, consultants, etc.) also produce forecasts making 
use of their knowledge about the countries where they are based. These private analysts’ forecasts are 










sprevious work on forecast evaluation, we want to place ourselves in the position of a forecast user that 
needs to know how much conﬁ  dence to place on each of these various forecasts that are available 
at a speciﬁ  c point in time. Besides following a slightly different empirical approach for choosing the 
timing of comparison of the various forecasts, this analysis aims to contribute to the existing literature 
by assessing a less known survey of private forecasters (The Economist) and by extending the assess-
ment to the most recent vintages of projections up to the latest recession.
The evaluation covers real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth forecasts, for the period 1991-2009, 
for nine main advanced economies.1 Several evaluation criteria will be used. We will assess the accuracy 
of forecasts in terms of magnitude (quantitative accuracy) and test their unbiasedness and efﬁ  ciency. 
We will also examine accuracy in terms of direction of change (directional accuracy) and brieﬂ  y assess 
the ability of forecasters to predict economic recessions. The performance of forecasters will be judged 
against different benchmarks: ﬁ  rstly, against a “naive” benchmark which establishes a minimum level 
of accuracy that a forecast should have and, secondly, the accuracy of international organisations’ 
forecasts will be compared to that of the alternative private analysts’ forecasts. As much as possible, 
the statistical signiﬁ  cance of these differences in accuracy will be tested.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the data set and conventions used. 
Section 3 evaluates the quantitative accuracy of forecasts. The weak form efﬁ  ciency of forecasts 
is studied in the following section. Section 5 examines two additional dimensions of accuracy: the 
directional accuracy and the ability to predict economic recessions. The last section summarises the 
results and brieﬂ  y compares them with the ﬁ  ndings of previous in-house evaluations of international 
organisations’ forecasts.
2.  Data set used
The study examines two groups of forecasts: the ones published by the IMF, the EC and the OECD and 
the mean forecasts of the panels of private analysts surveyed by the Consensus Economics and The 
Economist.2 We make use of the fact that international organisations publish projections two times per 
year (generally, in Spring and in Autumn) for both the current-year and the year-ahead.3 This means 
that we use four sets of forecasts which correspond to four different forecasting horizons. For a target 
year t , we will be looking at the Spring and Autumn next-year forecasts (reported in year  1 t - ) and 
the Spring and Autumn current-year forecasts (reported in year t ). For example, the IMF reported four 
forecasts for the 2000 German GDP growth: the Spring and Autumn 1999 next-year forecasts and 
the Spring and Autumn 2000 current-year forecasts. These forecasting horizons can be thought of as 
corresponding roughly to seven, ﬁ  ve, three and one quarter-ahead, respectively.
To investigate the relative performance of international organisations and private analysts it is necessary 
to decide on the timing of the comparison given that the surveys of private analysts are available on a 
monthly basis. A valid argument would be to choose a reference month for which the information set 
underlying the private analysts’ forecasts is similar to the one underlying each international organisa-
1  This article draws heavily on the work carried out in Abreu (2011), which also covers the performance of inﬂ  a-
tion forecasts. For additional details see Working Paper 20.
2  IMF, “World Economic Outlook”; EC, “European Economic Forecast”; OECD, “OECD Economic Outlook”; 
Consensus Economics, “Consensus Forecasts” and The Economist, “The Economist pool of forecasters”.
3  We will not consider any interim assessments published by these organisations and neither the two-year-ahead 
forecasts that are published in Autumn by the EC and the OECD. For an evaluation of OECD’s two-year-ahead 

























































IItion’s forecasts. Most previous work on forecast evaluation tries to follow this approach but typically 
end-up using rough approximations. Moreover, according to tentative evidence on the sensitivity of the 
relative performance of international organisations and private forecasters to changes in the dating, 
such as the one presented in Timmermann (2007) and Lenain (2001), the timing of the comparison 
presumably matters.
We decided to follow a slightly different empirical strategy in this work. The idea is to place ourselves 
in the position of a user that has a new forecast just released by an international organisation and also 
the more recent forecasts released by private institutions and needs to have an informed judgement 
about their relative reliability. To do this, we ﬁ  rst collected for each international organisation the 
public disclosure date of every forecasting exercise. Then, we selected for each private institution the 
forecast disclosed to the public at a closer date (before or no more than a couple of days after that 
of the international organisation). This means that the reference months used for the Consensus and 
for The Economist vary according to which international organisation they are being compared to and 
also differ somewhat over the sample period.4
The study focus on real GDP annual growth forecasts for nine advanced economies: the six major 
euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Belgium),5 the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Japan. The set of countries was chosen both on account of their importance 
in the world economy and of data availability across the institutions and the period under analysis.6 
Note that the deﬁ  nitions of the data collected can differ across institutions and over time (e.g. the 
working-day adjustment of GDP data and the German reuniﬁ  cation). As much as possible, given data 
availability, these differences are properly taken into account so that they do not affect the size of the 
forecast error. The observation period covers around two decades, from 1991 to 2009.7 However, it 
is important to be aware that the relatively small sample size (19 observations at most for each fore-
casting horizon) may limit the robustness of the inference that can be made and the number of cyclical 
ﬂ  uctuations to be studied.
Given that GDP data are subject to revisions, a choice has to be made concerning the outcome data 
to be used in the forecast evaluation. Though no single choice is optimal, we decided to take the 
conventional view that forecasters should be judged by their ability to predict the early releases of data 
rather than the later revisions, which often incorporate methodological changes and information that 
was not available to them at the time of forecasting.8 Hence, for each institution we use as outcome 
value for year t  the ﬁ  rst-available data reported in their Spring forecast exercise of the following year 
() 1 t + .9 This choice has the additional advantage of allowing us to take into account the differences 
in deﬁ  nitions among institutions.
4  Roughly speaking, the reference months used were mostly April and September for comparison with the IMF, 
April/May and October/November for comparison with the EC and May/June and November/December for 
comparison with the OECD.
5  Which represent over 85 per cent of euro area GDP.
6  In particular, The Economist’s survey does not provide forecasts for smaller euro area countries, including Por-
tugal.
7  The forecast exercises analysed go from Autumn 1991 till Autumn 2009. In the case of the IMF’s forecasts for 
Spain, Netherlands and Belgium the sample is slightly smaller given the lack of a couple of observations at the 
beginning of the period.
8  See McNees (1992) and Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) for a discussion on this issue.
9  In the case of private analysts, which no longer report year t  data in their ﬁ  rst forecast exercise of the follow-










sIn this study, the forecast error () e  is deﬁ  ned as the difference between the outcome/actual value 
() y  and the forecasted value () ˆ y . For each target year t , we analyse four different forecast errors 
corresponding to four different forecasting horizons () h . According to this notation, the forecast error 
can be generally written as:
, , th th t ey y =-  () 1
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 Autumn current-year forecast error
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3.  Quantitative accuracy of forecasts
To evaluate the quantitative accuracy of forecasts we examine the forecast errors and compute a 
set of conventional summary measures. The aim is to characterize in a simple way the distribution of 
errors. The ﬁ  rst measure is the mean error () ME , i.e. the arithmetic average of forecast errors over 
the available observations () n , for each horizon () h . Even though positive and negative errors might 
offset each other, the ME  gives an indication of a possible bias in the forecasts, with a negative sign 










= å () 2
The second is the standard deviation of errors () SD , which can give an indication about the uncertainty 














- å () 3
The third one is the root mean squared error () RMSE , which is the square root of the sample average 
of squared forecast errors (i.e. the square root of the mean squared error () MSE ). The RMSE  disre-
gards the sign of errors (puts equal weight on over- and under-predictions) and implicitly assumes that 
the seriousness of any error increases sharply with square the size of the error. Therefore, it penalises 
forecasters who make large errors.10
10 The  RMSE  is consistent with a symmetric quadratic loss function of forecasters. This assumption will be 
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These measures have been subject to some criticisms (see, for example, Fildes and Stekler (2002)). The 
RMSE  can be particularly affected by outliers which are common in economic data sets. Also, neither 
the ME  nor the RMSE  are scale independent. As done in Koutsogeorgopoulou (2000), we will adjust 
the RMSE  by the standard deviation of outcomes to compare performance across countries, in order 
to take into account the variability of the series being forecasted.
In addition, to evaluate the performance of a forecaster, these descriptive statistics are compared 
to similar statistics obtained from alternative forecasts available to the user. The ﬁ  rst alternative is a 
“naive” benchmark that serves to establish a minimum level of accuracy that a forecast should have. 
A frequent procedure is to use a no-change naive model. In this work we use instead a same-change 
naive model, which extrapolates a GDP growth rate similar to the one observed in the last period. As 
argued by McNees (1992), this is a more stringent and sensible basis of comparison for variables that 
tend to grow over time. To be fair to forecasters, we use for each forecasting horizon the last rate of 
change known at the time of forecasting. This is similar to assume that the variable to be forecasted 
follows a random walk.11 To formalise the comparison, we compute a version of Theil’s inequality coef-
ﬁ  cient () U , deﬁ  ned as the ratio of the MSE  of the forecaster being evaluated to the MSE  of the 
naive forecast  ,
N
th y
æö ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷ ç èø
 .12 If the Theil’s U  is less than one the forecaster being evaluated beats the naive 

























The second alternative is the benchmarking of other experts’ forecasts. In this study, the focus is on 
the comparison of the performance of each international organisation with that of the two private 
institutions. The comparison is based on the ratio of their respective RMSE .13 A ratio higher than one 
indicates a lower accuracy of the international organisation relative to the private institution.
Irrespectively of the benchmark used to evaluate the performance of a forecaster, it is necessary to test 
whether a forecaster’s errors are signiﬁ  cantly different from those of the benchmark, i.e. the difference 
should be tested for statistical signiﬁ  cance. For this purpose, we run the test for equal forecast accuracy 
proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995). To implement the test we estimate the following equation:14
11 In practice this means that: in Spring and Autumn  1 t - , the naive forecast for growth in year t  corresponds 
to the actual growth rate in year  2 t - ; in Spring and Autumn t , the naive forecast corresponds to the actual 
growth rate in year  1 t - .
12 In the case of a no-change naive model, the Theil’s U  corresponds to the ratio of the MSE  of the forecaster 
to the mean of squared outcomes, as originally proposed by Theil (1971).
13 Note that this ratio is equivalent to the square root of a corresponding Theil’s U  coefﬁ  cient.












,, , , , where th th th th th dd e e ae =+ = - () 6
being  , th e  the forecast errors of the forecaster being evaluated and 
*
, th e  the forecast errors of the 
benchmark (either the naive forecast or another forecaster). The null hypothesis of equal forecast 
accuracy () 0 :0 H a =  is tested using the small sample modiﬁ  cations proposed by Harvey et al. (1997).
3.1.  A general look at forecast errors
Chart 1 provides a general picture of GDP growth forecast errors over time for each projection hori-
zon.15 For the sake of simplicity, data refer to the average of the nine countries under analysis but 
similar assertions hold at the individual country level.16 It is clear that, for all institutions, errors are 
more signiﬁ  cant for next-year forecasts and much closer to zero for current-year forecasts, especially 
15 When presenting isolated data for the Consensus and The Economist they always correspond to the data set 
speciﬁ  cally used for comparison with the IMF’s forecasts. Nothing in substance would change if the data sets 
used for comparison with the EC or the OECD were chosen instead.
16 See Abreu (2011) for information at the country level.
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IIfor the shorter projection horizon (Autumn current-year). Indeed, the proﬁ  les of next-year forecasts 
are generally ﬂ  atter than the outcome while current-year forecasts tend to follow more closely the 
volatility of GDP growth. Forecast errors are quite similar across institutions as their forecasts tend to 
move closely together, particularly for current-year horizons.17 The correlation coefﬁ  cient of the various 
institutions’ current-year forecasts for GDP growth is close to one.
Year-ahead forecast errors are predominantly below zero (overestimation) for most countries and are 
especially pronounced at the beginning and end of the sample period, when most countries were 
experiencing economic recessions. There is a tendency of the various forecasters to overestimate growth 
when activity is slowing down and, for most countries, this was stronger than the underestimation 
during upswings of economic activity.18 Regarding current-year forecast errors, as mentioned before, 
they ﬂ  uctuate around zero and do not seem to present a clear bias over the sample period.
Table 1 reports some summary statistics of projection errors. For the various countries and institutions, 
it is clear that accuracy improves as more relevant information becomes available to the forecaster. Both 
the ME  and the RMSE  tend to be smaller as the horizon shortens. This is also true for the standard 
deviation of forecast errors and the reduction in uncertainty seems to be especially large as we move 
from next-year to current-year horizons. Regarding year-ahead horizons, the ME  for the group of nine 
countries analysed is negative for all institutions. In fact, GDP growth was overestimated more than 
50 per cent of the time by all forecasters. The mean error stands at around -0.8 p.p. of GDP growth 
for forecasts made in Spring  1 t -  and around -0.5 p.p. for forecasts made in Autumn  1 t - .19 Given 
that actual GDP growth averaged 1.6 per cent a year over this period, the accuracy of year-ahead 
forecasts is not particularly impressive. The countries with larger mean errors are the three major euro 
area countries and Japan.20 Let’s just mention that the large negative mean error in the case of Japan 
is associated with a high standard deviation. Regarding current-year horizons, forecasts seem to be 
generally unbiased. For the group of countries studied, the mean forecast error is very small and in the 
case of Autumn current-year forecasts is basically zero.
Looking at the RMSE  adjusted by the standard deviation of GDP growth outcomes, to take into 
account the fact that countries with higher GDP volatility might be harder to predict, the forecasting 
performance becomes somewhat more similar across the various countries.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the correlation of projection errors across countries is higher for 
year-ahead horizons but especially among euro area countries and, though less so, among these and 
the United Kingdom. The United States’ and Japan’s forecast errors are weakly correlated with each 
other and with those of other countries. Therefore, it can be said that error correlation appears to be 
substantial only for longer horizons and for economies with more synchronised business cycles, such 
as the euro area countries.
17 As mentioned before, we decided to use for each institution its own outcome value (as reported in its Spring 
forecast exercise of the following year) but the outcomes for each country turn out to be quite similar across 
institutions.
18 This looks consistent with existing evidence of a considerable sluggishness in revisions of growth forecasts, as 
documented for example in Loungani et al. (2011).
19 If we exclude the 2009 recession, the mean error would still be negative but slightly less: around -0.5 p.p. for 
forecasts made in Spring  1 t -  and around -0.3 p.p. for forecasts made in Autumn  1 t - .














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s3.2.  Assessing relative accuracy
Table 2 reports Theil’s U  coefﬁ  cient for the comparison of the various institutions’ GDP growth 
forecasts with a same-change naive benchmark. All forecasters have U  coefﬁ  cients lower than one, 
meaning that they all have a lower MSE  than the naive forecast.21 However, according to the results 
of the test proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995), the ﬁ  ve forecasters are signiﬁ  cantly better than 
the naive benchmark for current-year but not for next-year horizons. The negative estimates for the 
parameter a  are the equivalent to the result of U  coefﬁ  cients lower than one. For current-year hori-
zons, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy for most countries, at a 10 
per cent signiﬁ  cance level. For next-year horizons, it is not possible to conclude that the forecasters 
were signiﬁ  cantly better than the naive for the majority of countries (with a clear exception for Japan).
The comparison of the forecast accuracy of the three international organisations with that of the 
two private institutions is reported in table 3.22 In general, the RMSE  of international organisations’ 
forecasts does not differ much from that of private analysts, for the various countries and horizons. 
The ratio of RMSE  is in most cases close to one. The test of statistical signiﬁ  cance of the difference 
between the two sets of forecasts conﬁ  rms that, in general, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
international organisations and private analysts have similar forecast accuracy. There are just a few 
cases for the shorter forecasting horizon (Autumn current-year) where this hypothesis is rejected. In 
most of these cases one of the international organisations, though not always the same, proved to 
be more accurate than the Consensus or The Economist (ratio of RMSE  lower than one   negative 
estimate for a ). The evidence is somewhat more consistent for France and Belgium but even for these 
countries it seems far-fetched to conclude that international organisations perform consistently better 
in the shorter horizon.23
4. Efﬁ  ciency of forecasts
The evaluation of forecasts provided in the previous section does not assess their quality in the sense of 
being optimal with regard to a particular information set. To assess this we need to establish testable 
properties that an optimal forecast should have and, for that, we will assume that the objective func-
tion of forecasters is of the mean squared error type, i.e. forecasts minimize a symmetric quadratic loss 
function. As discussed in Timmermann (2007), this implies, under broad conditions, that the optimal 
forecast is unbiased and there is absence of serial correlation in the forecast errors. The existence of 
serially correlated errors means that it would be possible to improve the forecast using the information 
on known past errors. These requirements are usually referred to in the literature as weak efﬁ  ciency 
requirements and are empirically tested for our data set.
The test for the weak efﬁ  ciency requirements is performed directly on the properties of the forecasting 
errors (unbiasedness and absence of serial correlation). Indeed, for a h-period-ahead forecast to be 
21 This same-change naive benchmark proved to be more demanding than a no-change benchmark as we ex-
pected: Theil’s U  coefﬁ  cients are generally higher. There are a few exceptions for year-ahead forecasts for 
Germany, Italy and Japan, which experienced around zero GDP growth rates during some years of the sample.
22 Recall that, as explained in Section 2, each international organisation is compared with its speciﬁ  c data set for 
the Consensus and for The Economist.
23 We also run a Diebold and Mariano (1995) test for differences in accuracy among the international organisa-
tions and among the two private analysts and, again, it was not possible to reject equal forecast accuracy for 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IIefﬁ  cient, forecast errors can follow a moving average process of order not higher than  1 h - .24 To 
implement the test we estimate the regression:
,1 , , th t h th ee gb e - =+ + () 7
and perform the three following tests: a t-test for  0 g =  (unbiasedness), a  t-test for  0 b =  (no serial 
correlation) and an F-test for the joint hypothesis  0 g =  and  0 b =  (weak efﬁ  ciency). If b  is signiﬁ  -
cantly different from zero it would indicate that there is a systematic error with autocorrelation of a 
higher than appropriate order. For these econometric tests to be valid it must be the case that there is 
no serial correlation in the residual terms  , th e . The Breusch-Godfrey test is carried out to test for the 
presence of serial correlation in the residuals.25
The evidence regarding unbiasedness of GDP growth forecasts, presented in table 4, shows that for the 
majority of countries we are not able to reject that the mean error of year-ahead forecasts is statisti-
cally equal to zero. However, as hinted from the analysis in Section 3, forecasters present a tendency 
to signiﬁ  cantly overestimate GDP growth for the major euro area countries in year-ahead horizons.26 
Current-year forecasts have no signiﬁ  cant bias for the vast majority of countries and institutions (with 
a few exceptions for Italy and Spain).27
When testing jointly for unbiasedness and no serial correlation of forecast errors, it is not possible in 
most cases to reject that forecasts are efﬁ  cient for current-year horizons. For year-ahead horizons, 
the evidence points to inefﬁ  ciency of the various institutions’ forecasts for some euro area countries. 
This means that projections could have been improved if either the average bias or the information 
contained in past errors were properly taken into account.
5.  Additional dimensions of forecast accuracy
5.1.  Assessing directional accuracy
The traditional quantitative evaluation of macroeconomic forecasts tends to overlook the fact that, 
even if forecast errors are substantial, forecasts may provide useful information about the qualitative 
status of an economy, such as the acceleration/deceleration of economic activity. Useful forecasts 
should go in the right direction. This section investigates the directional accuracy of forecasts, i.e. 
the correctness of the projected direction of change of GDP growth.
24 Given that we are working with annual data, we assumed that h  could be either equal to 1 (for current-year 
forecasts) or 2 (for year-ahead forecasts). For  1 h = , the errors must be serially uncorrelated.
25  In cases deemed necessary, the test for weak efﬁ   ciency is performed by running an alternative regres-
sion:  ,1 1 , 2 2 , , th t h t h th ee e gb b e -- =+ + +  and testing for  12 0 bb ==  (no serial correlation) and for 
12 0 gb b ===  (weak efﬁ  ciency). Results presented in table 4 for Germany, France, Italy and Spain refer to 
this equation, given that the Breusch-Godfrey test applied to equation   (7) indicated possible serial correlation 
in the residuals in various cases.
26 The evidence of a signiﬁ  cant bias for major euro area countries in year-ahead horizons still holds if we exclude 
2009 from the sample.
27 As suggested by Holden and Peel (1990), we also perform a direct test for the statistical signiﬁ  cance of the bias 
by running the regression  ,, th th e ge =+  and making a simple Student’s t-test for  0 g = . This test conﬁ  rms 
in general the results presented in table 4 but there is additional evidence of a signiﬁ  cant bias in year-ahead 
forecasts for Japan, at a 10 per cent signiﬁ  cance level. This difference in results is probably related to the above 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IIBeing  t y  the actual growth rate in year t , let  1 tt t yy y - D=-  be the actual acceleration () 0 t y D>  
or deceleration () 0 t y D< in year t . Most previous studies compute the predicted acceleration/decel-
eration by comparing the forecasted growth rate with the actual growth rate of the previous period 
() ,, 1 th th t yy y - D=-  . However, for longer forecasting horizons this would imply using information 
not yet known to forecasters at the time of forecasting. To be consistent with the approach followed 
in Section 3 − use only information available to forecasters at each point in time − and following 
the methodology of Ashiya (2003), we decided to compute the predicted direction of change as the 
acceleration/deceleration implicit in the forecast at each forecasting exercise  ,, 1 , th th t h yy y -
æö ÷ çD=- ÷ ç ÷ ÷ ç èø
  
. To 
evaluate the directional accuracy of forecasts the sign of  , th y D
   is compared to the sign of  t y D .
The directional data for each country can be arranged in a 2x2 contingency table, in which the two 
rows represent positive and negative/null changes in the outcome and the two columns represent 
positive and negative/null changes in the forecast. If the number of cases in the diagonal ( 11 22 nn +=
cases where  t y D  and  , th y D
   are both  0 >  or both  0 £ ) is “sufﬁ  ciently” large compared to the total 
number of observations () n , the forecasts are considered to be directionally accurate. More formally, 
















~ åå () 8
The null hypothesis is that the sign of  t y D  and the sign of  , th y D
   are independent. The rejection of 
the null means that there is a signiﬁ  cant association between the actual and the predicted direction 
of change and, therefore, forecasts can be said to be directionally accurate.
As before, the directional accuracy of the various forecasters is compared to that of a same-sign of 
change naive benchmark. This naive benchmark extrapolates the same sign of change for GDP growth 
as was last observed at the time of forecasting. Also, the forecasting ability of the three international 
organisations in terms of direction of change is compared to that of the two private sector institutions.
Table 5 shows the proportion of times that forecasters correctly predicted that GDP was going to 
accelerate or decelerate. For the group of nine countries, forecasts of all institutions are accurate more 
than 60/70 per cent of the time for the year-ahead horizons. For current-year horizons their accuracy 
is higher, at around 80/90 per cent of the time.29 The results of the chi-squared independence test for 
the individual countries conﬁ  rm that there is a signiﬁ  cant association between the sign of change of 
GDP growth in the forecasts and in the outcomes for basically all countries, with some exceptions for 
the longest forecasting horizon.
When looking at different benchmarks to evaluate the directional accuracy of forecasts, it is clear that the 
ﬁ  ve forecasters were better at predicting the sign of change of GDP growth than a naive forecast for all 
28 See Ash et al. (1998) for an application of alternative non-parametric tests on the direction of forecasts.
29 Note that, for this group of countries, the sign of  , th y D
   proved to be a more accurate predictor than the sign 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IIhorizons, even if less so for the longest one.30 When we compare the institutions among themselves,31 
the directional accuracy of international organisations’ forecasts does not seem in general to differ 
signiﬁ  cantly from that of the Consensus or The Economist, for the various horizons.
5.2.  Ability to forecast recessions
An additional informative criterion to evaluate macroeconomic forecasts is the ability to predict turning 
points, considering both the number of actual turns that are correctly predicted and the number of 
false turns that are predicted. To analyse the forecasters ability to predict economic recessions, we 
deﬁ  ne recession as any year in which real GDP declined () 0 t y < .32
Over the sample period 1991-2009, a total of twenty-three recession episodes were identiﬁ  ed for the 
group of nine countries under analysis. The properties of forecasts during those recession episodes are 
summarised in table 6. When we compute the percentage of episodes that forecasters were able to 
anticipate, we see that in general they are not able to anticipate in the preceding year that a recession 
is going to occur. This is particularly true as of Spring of the previous year and more evident in the 
case of private analysts. Forecasters seem to identify recessions just in the year in which they occur, 
though by Spring of that year around half of the recession episodes are still not acknowledged by 
most forecasters. By Autumn of the year of the recession, even though the decline in GDP is correctly 
identiﬁ  ed in the vast majority of cases, the magnitude of the fall is still under-predicted for around 50 
per cent of the cases.33
During the period analysed, forecasters predicted a couple of false recessions. This is however a rare 
event and in most cases happened in current-year forecasts for years with close to zero GDP growth 
outcomes.
The evidence on the difﬁ  culties that forecasters experience in identifying economic recessions in advance 
(or even when they are occurring) is notable, both for international organisations and private analysts. 
Though the reasons for this do not seem to have been yet adequately explored, some authors such as 
Loungani (2001) have suggested that either forecasters lack the required information (reliable real-time 
data or models) or lack the incentives to predict recessions. In any case, we should keep in mind that 
these point forecasts reported by the various institutions may not capture shifts in the probability that 
they attach to worst case scenarios.
6.  General summary and comparison with previous evaluations
In this article, we assessed the accuracy of IMF’s, EC’s and OECD’s forecasts and compared it with 
that of the Consensus’ and The Economist’s surveys of private analysts. The focus was on economic 
growth forecasts for nine advanced economies, over the past two decades. We now provide an overall 
picture of our ﬁ  ndings and brieﬂ  y compare them with previous results from in-house evaluations of 
international organisations’ forecasts.
30 When we apply a chi-squared independence test to the naive benchmark it is not possible in general to reject 
the null hypothesis of no signiﬁ  cant association between the actual direction of change of GDP growth and 
that of the naive forecast.
31 Looking at the ratio of correct predictions of each international organisation to those of its corresponding data 
set for the Consensus and for The Economist (not provided in table 5).
32 A similar analysis of Consensus’ forecasts for a large group of countries can be found in Loungani (2001).
33 As mentioned in Section 3, forecasters show a tendency to overestimate growth when the economy is slowing 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IIWe ﬁ  nd that the accuracy of GDP growth projections clearly increases as the horizon shortens and 
more information becomes available to the forecaster. Regarding year-ahead horizons, even though 
the projections of the various forecasters are unbiased and efﬁ  cient in most cases, there is evidence 
of inefﬁ  ciency for some euro area countries. Year-ahead forecasts show a signiﬁ  cant negative bias 
for major euro area countries. This stems from a tendency of the various forecasters to persistently 
over-predict growth when the economy is slowing down, most noticeably during periods of economic 
recession. Current-year GDP growth forecasts are generally unbiased and efﬁ  cient.
Our analysis suggests that the quantitative accuracy of the GDP growth forecasts published by the IMF, 
the EC and the OECD is not statistically different from that of the Consensus or The Economist, for 
the various countries and horizons examined. In the rare exceptions observed for the shorter horizon 
(Autumn current-year), no institution proved to perform consistently better. All ﬁ  ve forecasters beat in 
general a naive model, which projects a GDP growth rate equal to the last one observed, for current-
year but not for year-ahead horizons.34
Notwithstanding a few distinctive features of the analysis undertaken, our ﬁ  ndings are broadly in line 
with those of the latest in-house assessments of forecasts published by the IMF, the EC and the OECD.35 
Timmermann (2007) analysis of IMF’s forecasts, over the period 1990-2003, found that GDP growth 
forecasts display a tendency for over-prediction in next-year horizons for various advanced economies. 
However, there is very little evidence on biases or serial correlation of errors for current-year forecasts. 
IMF’s performance is overall statistically similar to that of Consensus, even if the IMF performs slightly 
better in a few cases for current-year horizons. According to Melander et al. (2007) assessment of the 
EC’s forecasts, for the period 1969-2005, growth forecasts for the European Union generally proved 
to be unbiased and efﬁ  cient, though there is evidence of the contrary for some Member States. They 
also concluded that the track record of the EC’s forecasts is broadly comparable with the ones of the 
Consensus, the IMF and the OECD. The review of OECD’s growth projections for the G7 countries over 
the period 1991-2006, carried out by Vogel (2007), found that year-ahead forecasts are less accurate 
and have a tendency to overestimate the outcome. Current-year projections are, however, unbiased 
and efﬁ  cient. The author argues that OECD’s forecasts tend to outperform Consensus for the current-
year horizon.
Regarding the directional accuracy of GDP growth forecasts, we ﬁ  nd that all forecasters are directionally 
accurate in the various horizons, with some exceptions for the longest one. As before, the directional 
accuracy of international organisations’ forecasts does not seem to differ much from that of private 
analysts. The ﬁ  ve forecasters are better at forecasting accelerations/decelerations of economic activity 
than a naive benchmark.
There is a general agreement in the literature about the failure of most forecasters to predict economic 
recessions in advance and, sometimes, to detect them contemporaneously.36 Notwithstanding the 
limited number of observations, our brief evaluation of the recession episodes occurred in the sample 
34 Similarly, the assessment of inﬂ  ation forecasts performed in Abreu (2011) (which only covers the IMF, the Con-
sensus and The Economist) also concludes that the quantitative accuracy of IMF’s forecasts is similar to that 
of the Consensus and The Economist. The accuracy of these three forecasters is not in most cases statistically 
different from that of a naive random-walk model. Inﬂ  ation forecasts are generally unbiased and efﬁ  cient, 
both for year-ahead and current-year horizons, even though forecasters also display some tendency to over-
predict (under-predict) inﬂ  ation when it is falling (rising). Also, these three forecasters seem to be slightly more 
accurate at predicting inﬂ  ation than GDP growth for year-ahead horizons.
35 For earlier assessments see, for example, Artis (1997), Keereman (1999) and Koutsogeorgopoulou (2000).
36 See Fildes and Stekler (2002) for a survey and Loungani (2001) for evidence across a large sample of industri-










sof nine countries during the period 1991-2009 is totally consistent with this ﬁ  nding. As of Spring of the 
previous year no forecaster is able to predict that GDP is going to fall and by Spring of the recession 
year around half of the recession episodes is still not acknowledged by most forecasters. Moreover, 
the forecasts made in Autumn of the recession year still underestimate its magnitude in around 50 per 
cent of the cases. This underestimation was particularly notorious during the latest economic recession 
for all ﬁ  ve forecasters. Also, forecasters make very few predictions of recessions that do not occur. As 
pointed out by McNees (1992), this disturbing evidence about the inability to forecast economic reces-
sions advises the forecast user not to ignore the forecasts but rather to think carefully about plausible 
outcomes far from the central scenarios.
The ﬁ  ndings of this study are in line with previous evidence that current-year forecasts for economic 
growth in advanced economies present in general desirable features but year-ahead forecasts present 
a more mixed picture in terms of quantitative and qualitative accuracy. This understanding of how 
large forecast errors are likely to be and how often forecasters are likely to miss the direction where 
the economy is going is absolutely necessary in order to assess the usefulness of forecasts to its users. 
Some may consider disappointing the fact that the performance of reputed international organisations 
is generally similar to that of panels of private analysts. However, we must emphasize that international 
organisations’ forecasts serve a quite different purpose from those of private institutions. They do 
provide more than just point forecasts. In particular, they provide a detailed and consistent picture for 
the international outlook and a thorough discussion of the main issues and risks, besides policy recom-
mendations potentially valuable to policymakers. For the forecast user it might however be comforting 
to learn that he can place as much (little) conﬁ  dence in the alternative private analysts’ forecasts that 
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